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10 
S'i'ATZi'-1SN'I' OF FACTS 
Since the substance of ~his Appeal is crucially centered on 
the facts, and inasmuch as Respondent ~as hi~self devoted a 
substantial portion of his brief thereto, the following will 
attempt to reconcile and clarify t~e apparent discrepancies. 
Ini·cially, however, contrary to '.:he accusacions made by 
Res?ondent on page 2, paragraph 2 of his brief, the introductory 
comments in Appellant's opening brief are to be found in substan-
tial part in the allegations of the Contest, Ite.~ 6 of the Designa-
tion of ~ecord on Appeal, Paragraphs VII and VIII. The accusation 
11 that Appellants are in some way attempting "to get before this 
: 12 Court many matters which are simply not disclosed i:i the Record" 
is indeed spurious and without foundation. 
Secondly, after Respondent admonishes the Appellant for 
15 attempting to infuse these proceedings with unwholesome material 
16 not found in the Record, he proceeds to advise this Court that 
17 Appellant filed a Contest in California along with a Petition for 
lS Probate and that Decedent left his entire estate in Utah. The 
19 fact is that neither this Court, nor any court, has determined 
20 that these assets, now located in California, and under the charge 
11 of an administrator appointed by the California courts, has its 
u situs in Utah. Further, the Contest in California was filed not 
13 by Appella:1t but Resper.dent. The allegations of that Contest were 
24 
2) 
16 
...__ I 
verified by Respondent herein on January 22, 1976. 
Next, Respondent incorrectly remarks on page 4, paragraph 2 
'chat Appella;1 t i11 "proceedings fileo in San _iJiego Councy" claimed 
lh~ residence of Decedent ~o be San Diego, California or Ce~ar City 
-1-
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l Utah. In fac'c, this allegation is found in t.he Contest file: 
2 October 4, 1976 in the District Court of Iron County, State:' 
3 Utah, Paragraph II. Furthermore, whatever was done or has~ 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
accomplished in the courts of t2.e State o::: California is not 
part of this Record, nor has it any bearing on the rulings~j 
here to be reviewed. Respondent's connotation of the bi-stat'' 
I 
I proceedings as a "race to judgment", is again misleading a~ 
irrelevant. 
The Respondent's recitation of facts concerning then~~ 
times this matter has been set down for hearing and subseque:· 
vacated or continued is founded totally on Findings and ~~l 
prepared by Respondent and signed by the Court without any p: 
review by Appellant to permit corrections on amendments as to 
or content. In fact the only trial settings which appear of'. 
in this case occurred on February 2 6, 19 7 7 and March 8, 1977, 
The February trial setting was 'Jacated by Stipulation of Resr: 
17 (Item 8, Designation of Record) and the March hearing was vac 
18 due to the presiding judge's incapacity and only after Appell 
19 received less than ten (10) days' notice (Item 11, Designatic:~ 
20 Record). There was never a setting in December, 1976 or Jan:1 
21 1977 as Respondent would have this Court believe. When theC 
22 finally set the matter for hearing on May 23, 1977 (Item 12, I 
23 Designation of Record) , Appellant appeared ready to proceed '°I 
24 the trial proceeded. 
25 But even if Respondent's recitation of facts is correct 
26 of the settings occurred over a period of only four (4) to L 
27 months, during which time the Court .,,-as ,,-ell aware of Lhe: 
-2-
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encountered in arranging witnesses fron Southern California to be 
tra~sported to Southern Utah, in a co~?iicate~ case involving ex?ert 
testimony on mental incapacity and a cyriad of facts pertinent to 
substantiate the claims of fraud, duress anci undue influence. Be-
cause the Decedent spent the last ~hirty (30) years of his life in 
California very much as a hermit, and executed the will in ~uestion 
only three (3) days after his arrival in Utah, the testimony of the 
California witnesses is instrumental to the prosecution of this 
claim. 
After four (4) days of trial and seven (7) hours of jury 
deliberation, the jury returnee special interrogatories and the 
Court entered its judgment. However, the Court also ordered the 
trial on the merits to proceed the following day, a Friday, and 
to reconvene on Monday, May 30, a national holiday (Memorial Day). 
~he request for a continuance referred to by Respondent at the 
bottom of page 5 of his brief was denied, not granted by the Court. 
It was only after the Court decided it had failed to admonish the 
jury the preceding evening, that, on ~·lay 27, 1977, the matter was 
taken off calendar. This action was taken by the Court only after 
it had interrogated a number of jurors and discovered that they had 
indeed discussed the merits of the case amongst thernselves. Con-
trary to the inference raised by Respondent, the Court's order 
was ;-iot made to accommodate Appellant. (Iter.c 10, :Respondent's 
Designation of ~ecord, Paragrap~ 6). 
The purporteu oral notification of the June 28, 1977 trial 
date is next discussed. With a self-ser,:ing yet completely unsub-
stilntiated assertion, ~espondent asserts that this Notice was oral~ 
-3-
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transmitted to Appellant's co-counsel, Mr. Park, on June 1, 
I 
To support this statement, Respondent refers to Mr. p k' 
ar s "'t 
ledgement of that date in the reporter's transcript, Item 9 
the Designation of Record. However, a co;nplete recital of tr,, 
relevant portion of the transcript is devoid of any such cone'./ 
"MR. CHA!1BERLAIN: I might state, your Honor, in 
connection with that trial setting, your Honor, my 
office received a telephone call prior to the time r 
received the formal jury trial setting from the Court 
Administrator, Clerk, setting the matter for trial, 
told me the date that it was set for trial, and that 
was approximately June 1st. 
THE COURT: I-tr. Park, did you receive similar notice? 
MR. PARK: Yes, your Honor. i·1y secretary called San 
Diego pursuant to the Court's instructions, I'm not 
I 
I 
l 
sure what day it was, but I did receive a call." l' 
Note that Mr. Chamberlain representing Respondent at tha'.: 1; 
hearing could only give an approximate date while Mr. Park ad 11 
ledging receipt of such a call, does not affirm June 1st orJ 10 
other date. As reflected in Paragraph 12 of the Statement ofl 11 
Facts in the opening brief, this call was made on June 13,~ n 
June 1. Interestingly enough, the trial court at the heari~ D 
provided no assistance in pinpointing this date. (see, rter 14 
the Respondent's Designation of Record). If Respondent is t: IS 
believed, it is indeed curious that the trial court wait~ u 
seventeen (17) additional days before maili!lg its written OC1 17 
on June 17, 1977 to counsel setting the matter for trial 0 
-4- f 
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June 28, 1977. [Inasmuch as the Certificate of llailL1g from the 
court was not present in the copy of the Designation of Record 
3 . provided by this Court, I have attached a copy of that Order and 
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the mailing certificate.] 
I 
FAILING TO GRANT THE REQUESTED T\·;o-w:o::Ex CONTINuANCE 
AS ;\N ABUSE OF DISCRLTIO:~ A.c'W AS DS~'UAL O:!" DUE 
PROCESS. 
As indicated above, Respondent's bold assertion on page 7 that 
there have been eight (8) settings and "many continuances", is 
totally unfounded. The facts recited in the trial court's Findings 
of Fact, Item 10 of the Respondent's Designation of Record, does 
not otherwise find support in the Record. Furthermore, these 
"settings" were not all concerned with the san:ie proceeding. Rather, 
they involved settings for the Petition for Probate, a contest 
before probate as well as a contest after probate. Each stage of 
the estate proceedings must in all fairness be separately analyzed. 
Respondent, of course, would rather group them all together to 
raise the implication that the Appellants have been dilatory and 
derelict in their prosecution of this claira. It is submitted that 
if Respondent truly believed that Appellant was being dilatory, 
why then did he not move to dismiss this case at the trial court 
level. In addition, this Court may take judicial notice of the 
vigor with which this appeal is being prosecuted. 
The filing of the Interlocutory Appeal on June 17, 1977, 
twenty (20) days after the Court's judgment upon the findings of 
the advisory jury, contrary to ~espondent's_contention was not 
unreil so:wble in view of the June 28, 1977 trial date. Recall first 
-5-
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that the Court on May 3, 1977 de:ried J..,::ipellant's Motion for./ 
continuance of the trial O:!! the :::leri ts to pursue this inter:'l 
remedy following a determinatio:-1 of do:::icile. The same Moticl 
was made and denied on May 29, 1977 afc:er the domicile trial,~ 
importantly, the Findings and Conclusions were not entered b;I 
trial court until June 3, 1977 and the Ir:~erlocutory Appeal,, 
taken from the denial of additional Motions for a Stay and fc:: 
Mental Examination heard on June 7, 1977. Furthermore, under 
9 Rule 72(b), Appellant is given thirty (30) days within which: 
his Petition in the Supreme Court. Utilizing ten (10) days i:: 
view of these facts can hardly be dee~ed dilatory. 
Recall also that Appellant's reqt:ested two ( 2) -week con'. 
of the trial date was not based solely on the Supreme Court's .. : 
denial of the Interlocutory Decree the day before trial as~ 
by Respondent.on pages 7-9 of his brief. The Appeal was on!:· 
several reasons for requesting the brief interlude. The s~rt 
17 Notice of Trial together with renewed hope for the Court to I 
18 favorably rule on a Motion to Change Venue was also of primar: 
19 concern particularly in view of the rc.ther strong and damagin: 
20 testimony profferred by a forrne~ juror ir: the domicile trial.· 
21 Bonzo and two other longstanding resicents. The additional : 
22 was also requested to perrni t the Court ti:ne to review these 
23 affidavits. 
24 Mrs. Bonzo' s testimony in relevant part is recited on p: 
25 lines 1-9 of Appellant's Opening Brief. It was this same te::, I 
ur; 26 for which Appellant made an offer of proof to the trial~ ., 
27 the time of the hearing. The trial co'.irt accepted the offe' i 
-6-
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proof, refused to take the rn.atter under suo?:\ission to riermit the 
affidavits to be reviewed but agreed to allo~ the affidavits to be 
belatedly received. (Item 23, Paragraph 2, Designation of Record 
on Ap?eal, Item 8, Respondent's Designation of ~ecord). 
Respondent has himself acknowledged the relative importance 
of these affidavits together with the affidavits of John Rowberry 
and Ada Thorley by moving first in the District Court to strike 
the affidavits and secondly, by making a Motion in the Supreme 
Court to supplement the Record to show the District Court's Order 
10 wherein the same affidavits were considered. The Supreme Court 
11 on December 5, 1977, however, permitted the affidavits to be 
I 
1!:12 considered in this Appeal upon ~·lotion of Appellant notwithstanding 
i! 13 the District Court's Order. 
c! 
~ I ~ It is also of interest to note that when on June 28, 1977, the 
15 Mot ion for a two ( 2) -week continuance was made and denied, the 
16 Court was not even ready to proceec since a jury had not even been 
17 summoned by the Clerk, thus necessitating the Court's instruction 
18 to the Clerk to call up a jury for the following day. A delay of 
19 two (2) weeks, therefore, would have been even less of an impositior 
20 on the Court and t~he county would have afforded counsel for 
21 Appellant, in view of all circlli~stances, to be adequately prepared 
22 to meet his burden. 
23 The Court could readily perceive the expense and inconvenience, 
24 not to mention the inability to produce certain expert witnesses on 
15 such short notice, that would abound in prepari::ig for a trial and 
U bringing all the witnesses from Southern Ca~ifornia with a good 
17 r-h;ince that the trial would never proceed on schedule. Appellant's 
-7-
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perhaps to their detriraent, relied upc~ the trial court's 
fairness and justice in grantin; one s~ort continuance in 
T 
I 
se: I 
Viel 
the following events: (1) a sho:::-t trial notice, (2) a denial 
an Interlocutory Appeal the day preceding trial, ( 3) the deniq 
a Hotion to Stay Proceedings, and (4) a denial of a :.lotion tol 
Change the Place of Trial. All were thought to be compellinq 
reasons for relying on the Court's inherent power to modify 
trial calendar. 
Certainly two ( 2) weeks was not too nuch to ask when the 
Appellant had borne the expense of a year and a half of litig1 
untold costs, and had already undergone one trial of a week's 
duration and had filed a lengthy Petition for Interlocutory A;. 
To deny Appellant at the most crucial time of the litigation,· 
little time, to finally present his case on the merits in the 
possible way, was indeed an abuse of discretion and a denial: 
due process. 
The remaining issues raised by Respondent have been addrc 
to the satisfaction of Appellant in 
conclusionary remarks, however, are 
his Opening Brief. Resro: 
again wholly inappropriatil 
this Appeal, finding no support in the ~ecord. Thus labellir,: 
these proceedings a "race to judgment", alluding to A!?pellant 
"unwillingness" to try the case in Utah, and arguing the Apoel 
"extreme diligence" in trying this elsewhere, is both unfounc1 
and irrelevant. I 
Suffice it to say that Appellant was not willing to fore:I 
1 t' I 
constitutional rights to a fair trial ~efore an irnpartia 
upon adequate notice. Had _7\ppellan t been accorded the cour 
-8-
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; 
a two (2)-week continuance, the trial would have proceeded in Iron 
county with a full complement of witnesses in a true adversary 
spirit. And, had the District Court, as requested, moved the trial 
to an adjoining county, the proceedings would have taken on an even 
greater dignity without the probability of local bias. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that the judgment 
and rulings of the trial court be reversed. 
DATED: -~~ ___ l-_r:t __ , 197 8. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HIGGS, FLETCHER & HACK 
B~~tt/L-T omas E. Miller, Attorneys for 
Appellant 
I ~Ii DATED: 
i. Ii 
15 11, SNOW, CHRISTE~SEN 
By~__\;=-=!¥-~.=...:.~~_:_~~~=-=-~~~~1 
Rex 1-Iadsen, 
16 I\ 
17 \, 
18 Appellant 
19 
20 
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